Source:
MOM and LTA issue interim safety procedures to
http://www.msn.com/en-sg/news/singapore/mom-and-lta-issue-interim-safety-procedures-to-smrt-amidst-ongoing-investigations/ar-BBr9LGg?li=BBr8Cnr
As reported, the findings to the
LTA and MOM had issued strict requisites for
Who is the Boss?
I believe there would be a slew of recommended safety actions by independent safety experts but how many would be accepted for implementation? The question to ask is who is the real boss who ultimately makes all the decisions : to do or not to do? Can we stop service, repair and maintenance works during service hours and run the risks of being penalized for disruptions and complaints? Most likely this is not going to happen. Everyone knows our train services cannot stop because there is no alternative. If you have been relying on trains to get from point A to B, you pray that service is not disrupted because there is no alternative. There is no bus service that runs parallel to each network line. If you are taking the bus routes to reach your destination, you have to spend hours waiting and make multiple bus transfer. Nobody does this unless you are a tourist here for sigh-seeing and has hours to spare.
Safe Work Procedures
I strongly believe
In this accident where a team was dispatched to check on the faulty monitoring device near the track, does it comply to procedures to send a team of 15men? Who had authorized this entry (who puts 15 men at risk) onto the tracks while the trains were still running?
Risk Assessments
I hope the Safety Managers would seriously review this and all existing risk control measures for their work activities. Priority should be given on those activities that need to be performed during service hours. The most effective risk control measures is by elimination of risks (i.e. perform work after service hours). The next control is through substitution (can we use robots or remote means to check things instead of deploying men physically on the tracks?). Next alternative is via engineering controls where technology could be deployed to isolate trains moving into work zones. Relying on administrative controls is one of the least effective to prevent accidents or near misses. When such controls are forgotten or not complied with, it becomes “safety lapses” as mentioned in this case.